The New-Tort Centrifuge by Bernstein, Anita
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
Winter 1999
The New-Tort Centrifuge
Anita Bernstein
Brooklyn Law School, anita.bernstein@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Other Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
49 DePaul L. Rev. 413 (1999-2000)
THE NEW-TORT CENTRIFUGE
Anita Bernstein*
For the last three years, the National Law Journal ("NLJ") has run
a feature on new torts, enumerating causes of action unknown to the
Torts treatises and casebooks. Examples include "pharmacy malprac-
tice,"1 "borrower harassment," 2 and "wrongful interference with the
doctor-patient relationship."' 3 The list is derived from a review of the
year's largest jury verdicts, followed up with interviews of lawyers and
judges.4 All of the phrases became noteworthy to the NLJ for what
they achieved in a tough arena. They survived defense efforts toward
settlement or dismissal before trial, impressed jurors as conceptions of
wrongful conduct, yielded profits to plaintiffs' lawyers, and struck
judges as stable innovations within tort law.5
Margaret Cronin Fisk, the journalist who built the new-tort beat at
the NLJ, has not settled firmly on what to call the items on the annual
list. The occasional reference to new torts in NLJ headlines is not
hers; Fisk would prefer to say "emerging torts."'6 There are no new
torts, she contends: "it's all new wrinkles on old ones."' 7 This problem
of when, how, and why to name new types of tort claims-you might
mistake Fisk's point for a quibble-is the subject I want to address
here. At a different gathering back in 1996 ("the Texas symposium"), 8
I cast my lot implicitly with the NLJ headline writers, arguing that
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Visiting Professor, Emory University
School of Law, 1999-2000. Thanks to Jacob Corrd for his insightful comments on a draft.
1. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Looking for a New Cause of Action?, NAT'L L.J., May 19, 1997, at
Al, A13 [hereinafter New Cause of Action].
2. Margaret Cronin Fisk, 10 Innovative Tort Claims, NAT'L L.J., July 20, 1998, at Al, A16
[hereinafter Innovative Tort Claims].
3. New Cause of Action, supra note 1, at A13. For Fisk's 1999 stories on this subject, see
Margaret Cronin Fisk, Old Torts, New Bottles, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 27, 1999, at Al; Margaret Cronin
Fisk, The Whistleblower Juggernaut, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1999, at Al.
4. Telephone Interview with Margaret Cronin Fisk, Contributing Editor for the National Law
Journal (Oct. 8, 1998) [hereinafter Fisk Interview].
5. See generally New Cause of Action, supra note 1 and Innovative Tort Claims, supra note 2
(explaining the inception and development of a variety of new torts).
6. New Cause of Action, supra note 1, at Al; Innovative Tort Claims, supra note 2, at A2.
7. Fisk Interview, supra note 4.
8. W. Page Keeton Symposium on Tort Law, Nov. 1996; proceedings published in 75 TEX. L.
REv. 1499 (1997).
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activists create new torts, a handful of which become familiar and
even powerful.9
What exactly is a new tort?
At the Texas symposium, I ventured a definition that strove for par-
simony, in my belief that the task of describing how new torts are
formed commends a short list rather than an expansive one, to fore-
stall criticism among the lines of "that's all very well, but loss of, say,
recreational value of a natural resource isn't really a new tort."'10 To
keep the list tight and pristine, I insisted that the nominated cause of
action be "both novel and free-standing."' 1 The free-standing crite-
rion eliminated claims that expanded the domain of damages (paren-
tal consortium, for instance), variations on a theme of negligence (for
instance, I would not have admitted "pharmacy malpractice"), and
private rights of action based on violations of the Constitution or stat-
utes. 12 I also wanted to see evidence that lawyers, judges, and com-
mentators had accepted the newcomer into the fold of American torts.
Blackletter in the Restatement provided such evidence, although I ad-
mitted wrongful discharge into the roster without it. The criteria
yielded three clear winners in addition to wrongful discharge: inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and strict
products liability. These three causes of action are all closely associ-
ated with the same impresario, William Prosser.13
The stances and strategies of Prosser built the most successful new
torts in the United States. Although the evidence is by hypothesis
unattainable, one may assume that Prosser's new torts were accompa-
nied by stunted, aborted contemporaries-that is, failed proposals now
forgotten.14 New torts on the current drawing board, including "sup-
9. See Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539,
1544 (1997).
10. Respondents mentioned this new tort in interviews. See Innovative Tort Claims, supra
note 2, at A17.
11. Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1540.
12. Id. at 1540-41.
13. See generally William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37
MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939) [hereinafter Prosser, Intentional Infliction] (summarizing and ex-
tending the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48
CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, Privacy] (listing four types of privacy claims, a
scheme found also in the Restatement of Torts); William L. Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, Assault] (detail-
ing and extending the end of privity barriers to consumer litigation against product
manufacturers).
14. Cf Philip Yancey, Genes and Evolution: Do Humans Have a Dark Nature?, CURRENT,
May 1, 1999, at 18 (noting a tenet of evolutionary biology that only a minority of potential new
individuals survive).
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pression"'15 and hate speech,16 by their fragility support the inference
that most proposals are precarious and others doomed. The print ver-
sion of my Texas symposium piece, How to Make a New Tort: Three
Paradoxes,17 offered an argument presented in the form of "para-
doxes," or institutional obstacles, about why proposed new torts fail.
These paradoxes-presumptions against novelty, famed activists, and
even tort law itself-entrench resistance to new tort proposals.' 8
A couple of participants at the Texas symposium took issue with the
parsimony of my working definition of "new tort." Gary Schwartz, for
instance, said that the erosion of immunities amounted to new torts in
all but name. Back home, one of my colleagues said he saw no good
reason to exclude from the new-tort roster the expansion in private
rights of action for violations of statutes. I held my ground, or most of
it. As this Clifford Symposium demonstrates, new-tort formation war-
rants attention as a discrete event, and I would have hated to say that
the entire project merges into vaguely bounded "judicial activism,"
expansion of rights and remedies, access to the courts, or the culture
of complaint. Labels like those convey little more than partisan noise.
The way to redeem and refine the new-tort thesis of How to Make a
New Tort, I now think, is to acknowledge that the project of making
new torts is rooted in a particular age. Seen as a group, the Prosser
triumphs, as well as the narrow definition of a new tort that I extrapo-
lated from them, are historically anomalous. For centuries, the com-
mon law of torts never resembled a well-codified recitation of offenses
(or should one say trespasses?) parallel to the list of common-law
crimes. Instead its defining traits have always included ambiguity,
gaps between real stories and conventions of pleading, uncertainty
about objectives, and even basic doubts about its own nature-as we
instructors who try at our first class meetings to announce a definition
of "tort" can attest.
With the word centrifuge, then, I not only mean to evoke a mecha-
nism that breaks formations apart but also to suggest that this function
has a centripetal counterpart, a force that pulls toward the center.
15. See Rory Lancman, Protecting Speech From Private Abridgement: Introducing the Tort of
Suppression, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 223, 238-44, 262-63 (1996).
16. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 179-81 (1982); see also Edward A. Amley, Jr.,
Note, Sue and Be Recognized: Collecting § 1350 Judgments Abroad, 107 YALE L.J. 2177, 2207-08
(1998) (siting hate speech tort in the context of wider legal regulation that includes criminal law
and international human rights law).
17. Bernstein, supra note 9.
18. As Judge Clarence Newcomer has put it, "[t]ruly new torts are rarely accepted." Arch v.
American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 494 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
1999]
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Concepts spin away but also coalesce. How to Make a New Tort de-
scribed the process of coming together;19 this Article turns to a pro-
cess of dispersal. Neither component tells the full story of new torts.
References to the past, present, and future of new torts invite pre-
dictions. I'll plunge ahead. Although an era that encouraged concep-
tual coalescence made new-tort formation easier for Prosser than for
his predecessors and successors, observers can expect some version of
new-tort formation to persevere. Formally delineated torts may come
again into vogue, just as they did in the twentieth century. Current
indicators, however, suggest that in the near future we can expect an
increase in dispersal-a kind of anti-formation-in the common law of
torts. By dispersal I do not mean chaos, and "the new-tort centrifuge"
isn't a postmodernist celebration, or lament, of the end of doctrine.
As in the heyday of the writ system, post-Prosser tort development
does not stick rigidly to definitional boundaries. But even as it dis-
perses, tort law maintains fidelity to unifying principles.
I. THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY ANOMALY
The idea that new torts form is a concept uniquely situated in one
particular century. Only about fifty years ago did judges start to take
explicit note of new causes of action.20 The phrase "new tort" began
to appear in legal scholarship in 193921 and soon took hold. From the
start, proposals by plaintiffs' lawyers and scholars faced an uphill bat-
tle. Although judicial authors in recent decades have frequently re-
fused to accept a plaintiff's invitation to create a new tort,22 writers
19. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1544-59.
20. See, e.g., Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d 81, 82-83 (D.C. 1946) (surveying the
literature on insult and outrage while considering new-tort liability); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co.,
106 N.E.2d 742, 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952) (accepting privacy tort); Wright v. E-Z Finance Co., 267
S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. App. 1954) (expressing uneasiness with the new tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress). Prosser identified harbingers of this judicial recognition. See Wil-
liam L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REv. 40, 42-43 (1956) (suggesting that
"somewhere around 1930 it began to be generally recognized that the intentional infliction of
mental disturbance ... could be a cause of action in itself").
21. See Prosser, Intentional Infliction, supra note 13, at 874 ("It is time to recognize that the
courts have created a new tort.").
22. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1546 n.38 (citing cases where courts refuse to create new
torts). For more recent refusals, see Vice v. Conoco, Inc., 150 F.3d 1286, 1291 (10th Cir. 1998)
(declining to accept new tort of wrongful discharge); Country Corner Food & Drug, Inc. v. First
State Bank & Trust Co., 966 S.W.2d 894, 898-99 (Ark. 1998) (refusing proposed new tort for
breach of a general obligation of good faith in contracting); Patel v. OMH Med. Ctr., Inc., No.
1999 Okla. 33, 1999 Okla. LEXIS 38, at *49-54 (Apr. 27, 1999) (rejecting plaintiffs attempt to
gain relief in tort for "litigation-related misconduct").
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continue to propose new causes of action. 23
How to Make a New Tort, having proposed to study inductively the
formation of new torts, hewed to the convention of the waning cen-
tury.2 4 My premise was that when distinct, individually delineated
new torts survive the rigors of formation and enter the judicial lexi-
con, they become sources of redress for injured plaintiffs-sources that
were not in place beforehand. For example, a worker is better off with
a new tort of "wrongful discharge," a consumer is aided by "strict
products liability," and so forth. 25 Although How to Make a New Tort
began with a soupgon of cynicism from S.F.C. Milsom, adverting to
the futility of creating new torts,26 it concluded that these products of
reformers did yield progressive effects. 27
How to Make a New Tort used its title phrase to label three distinct
paradoxes about resistance. 28 The first paradox consists of new torts
qua torts ("tort"), the second of novelty ("new"), and the third of
agency ("how to make"). The tort paradox may be observed from the
relative success of different doctrinal labels. An unfamiliar tort is
more jarring than a newly articulated right of contract or property;
therefore some new torts hide under these alternative rubrics. Judge-
made novelty also provokes resistance about authority and legitimacy,
resembling the concerns raised about judicial invalidation of statutes
as unconstitutional.2 9 Lastly agency, the power of a reformer with an
23. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1539, 1559-63. Newer additions to the literature include
Arnold Anderson, The New Tort of Negligent Supervision, Wis. LAWYER, Sept. 1998, at 14; M.
Mercedes Fort, A New Tort: Domestic Violence Gets the Status It Deserves in Jewett v. Jewett, No.
93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Spokane County April 21, 1993), 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 355 (1997);
Eric Jorstad & John Borger, Invasion of Privacy: Minnesota's New Torts, BENCH & BAR MINN.,
Oct. 1998, at 39.
24. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1544-47.
25. Id. at 1557-58. Some commentators have disagreed. See, e.g., Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The Case Against "Tortification" of
Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387, 389-90 (1994) (noting that wrongful discharge
claims are often found in a long, redundant "laundry list" in a worker's complaint); Prosser,
Assault, supra note 13, at 1114 (suggesting that strict products liability would give plaintiffs al-
most nothing they did not already have under negligence and warranty).
26. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1539.
27. Id. at 1539 n.2.
28. See id. at 1544-59.
29. A point I treated only obliquely in How to Make a New Tort relates the paradox of novelty
to the constitutional-law "countermajoritarian difficulty." See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1547.
Scholarship on this subject does not focus on temporal concerns, stressing instead that the legis-
lative work product is associated with majorities in a democracy, whereas some judges-and all
Article III federal judges-exercise political power without having stood for election. Institu-
tions, rather than temporal precedence, take center stage. Yet, most writing on the subject
presumes, with little elaboration, that new judge-made law is more problematic than old. See,
e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (emphasizing judicial nullification of statutes where judges have the
1999]
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agenda, clashes with the belief that the common law develops gradu-
ally and organically, rather than by the stroke of a lawmaker's pen.30
Despite these obstacles, new torts did form in the twentieth century,
and the man who (more than anyone else) made them illustrates what
helps them take shape. William Prosser was aided by unique re-
sources: sharp wit, a shrewd command of case law, good connections
in the American Law Institute, and sincere disdain for plaintiffs that
refuted any suspicions about a bleeding heart. 31 I now contend, how-
ever, that Prosser had another essential resource: his times. He found
an ally in the conjunction of Legal Realism and formalism.
We may like to think that the middle of the twentieth century was a
heyday for Realism, a time for right-thinking observers to scoff at
Christopher Columbus Langdell and his works. Such scoffing took
place abundantly during the years of Prosser's craftsmanship. Never-
theless new torts were able to take shape because of opportunities
rooted in formalism as well as Realism.
Legal Realism invited well-situated European-American men like
Prosser to embark without shame on changing the law. It weakened
the claims of Blackstone and others that the common law emerges
from-and gives extra authority to-unvarying and inviolate natural
rights and thereby built an intellectual avenue for reform. Relating
case outcomes to circumstances, Legal Realism proposed that law
should strive to be useful in its context. Contexts, which change over
time, include the relevant insights of social science, the group-based
sources of identity for judges and legislators, and the policy influences
that affect how cases are presented and decided. 32 Prosser, then, came
of age in a liberating era, a reform-nurturing moment in tort law.
Yet in order for new tort agendas to thrive, this nurturing effect
needed a complementary phenomenon. Realism gave reform its intel-
lectual legitimacy, but formalism gave reformers discrete projects,
reassured onlookers that their measure would not go out of control,
last word); MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 152, 169-73 (1994) (faulting as "romantic"
judges who make new law without feeling constrained by various preceding conditions). See
generally Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication As Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 435
(1997) (arguing that common law change must take place with great care in order to not threaten
"truly democratic legitimacy"). Novelty thus bears closely on the legitimacy of judicial lawmak-
ing. I return to the question of legitimacy below at infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
30. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1552.
31. Id. at 1553.
32. See generally JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SO-
CIAL SCIENCE (1995) (describing common themes among diverse writings in the Realist
tradition).
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and provided stabilizing links to precedent. "The forms of action, ' 33 a
frequently invoked phrase in Torts, points up the centrality of formal-
ism to civil redress for injury. Formalism took on extra importance in
the era of new-tort formation: while all common-law formation needs
a degree of formalism to buttress its legitimacy, 34 Torts is peculiarly
dependent on this support. 35 I have recounted the suspicion and panic
surrounding tort innovations and the cleverness of reformers, Prosser
in particular but also others, who were able to invoke the law of con-
tracts and property, both stronger domains of formalism, when mak-
ing new torts.36
In the locution of How to Make a New Tort, formalism helped law
reformers overcome the paradoxes of tort, novelty, and agency.37 We
may chortle along with Roscoe Pound and Jerome Frank about the
naivete of believing that logic, rules, or syllogisms can tell us how
cases come out.38 These devices, however, retain appeal to onlookers
33. FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (1909).
34. The common law has been, and remains, perpetually vulnerable to accusations of lawless-
ness from European civilians and their admirers. See Jack Beatson, Has the Common Law a
Future?, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 291, 299-300 (1997) (contending that the common-law judge tends
to ignore statutes, despite their proliferation and importance); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Consti-
tution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3,13-14
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (warning of the danger of usurpation by common-law judges); Benja-
min P. Friedman, Comment, Fishkin and Precedent: Liberal Political Theory and the Normative
Uses of History, 42 EMORY L.J. 647, 702-03, 703 n.282 (1993) ("[a] common law judicial system
and a liberal political system do not match" because only the civil law can provide for self-
reflection, discussion, and enlightened input); cf Peter G. Stein, Judge and Jurist in the Civil
Law: A Historical Interpretation, 46 LA. L. REV. 241, 252 (1985) (adverting to the ideal among
the drafters of the French Civil Code that any judge "imbued with the spirit" of the Code could,
and should, apply it mechanically and predictably).
35. One condition that makes American tort law vulnerable to criticism about legitimacy is
the civil jury. This institution distinguishes American tort law from the tort law of other nations
in a way that some critics find unstable, if not lawless. For a summary of current accusations and
a retort, see Philip H. Corboy et al., Illinois Courts: Vital Developers of Tort Law as Constitu-
tional Vanguards, Statutory Interpreters, and Common Law Adjudicators, 30 Lov. U. CHI. L.J.
183, 186-91 (1999) (applauding judicial invalidation of state tort reform statute). I return to the
jury below. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
Even tort systems that lack juries, however, often appear chaotic to observers. The criticisms
of Australian judge Robert French are apposite. See Robert S. French, Statutory Modeling of
Torts, in TORTS IN THE NINETIES 211, 217 (Nicholas J. Mullany ed., 1991) (proposing that stat-
utes replace the common law of torts because they are "conducive to a more ordered, rational
and legitimate" legal system). See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (describing pressures on the tort system to become more uniform
and predictable).
36. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1561-62.
37. Id.
38. The principal works of these authors on the subject of indeterminacy are JEROME FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1949); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L.
REV. 605 (1908). Frank once compared traditional legal reasoning to the "the necks of the flam-
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because they (appear to) limit and constrain caprice among those who
interpret the law.
This combination of two opposing jurisprudential postures permit-
ted new torts to form and to be labeled as new formations. Realism
declared that judges make as well as find the law and that advocates
and agenda-bearers participate in lawmaking. Formalism supported
the premise that torts, like crimes, each present a separate set of de-
fining elements, sharp distinctions between elements of the prima fa-
cie case and defenses, and an element of clarity that warns potential
offenders about how far they can go. These novel perspectives de-
parted sharply from a long common-law heritage.
II. TORTS TRADITIONS: DISPERSAL AND UNITY
Tort law believes (if the reader will forgive or tolerate a personifica-
tion) that disputes between individuals must be resolved in terms of
unifying concepts. To aid administration, tort law classifies and labels
disputes, but its labels are broader than the narrower recitations that
characterize modern criminal law. It was ever thus, at least since the
Norman conquest. Here I need to recite, with no scholarly preten-
sions, a short standard history of the kind one can read in first-year
casebooks and other pedagogical materials.
Beginning in the late eleventh century, the king's courts required
litigants to obtain writs; oral complaints standing alone would no
longer be heard in this forum.39 Many litigants and advocates favored
the king's courts over local tribunals because of their power to hear
bigger cases, and so they learned to live with writs. At the king's
court, the writ-or what we would now call a writing-was a form
purporting to be a letter from the king. This document contained an
order addressed to the sheriff of a county, instructing him to bring a
defendant into court. About 200 years later the standard writs, or
"brevia," became fixed. Without the ability to create new writs, liti-
gants had to tailor their complaints to fit these standard patterns.40
Fictions in pleading developed from these rigidities. The most fa-
mous contrivance, for us who teach contemporary tort law, was the
extension of "trespass" to include "case." Trespass, the ancestor of
ingos in Alice in Wonderland, which failed to remain sufficiently rigid to be used effectively as
mallets by the croquet-players." United States v. Rubinstein, 151 F.2d 915, 923 (2d Cir. 1935)
(Frank, J., dissenting).
39. See STROUD FRANCIS CHARLES MILSOM, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
31 (1985).
40. See Michel Bastarache, The Challenge of the Law in the New Millennium, 25 MANITOBA
L.J. 411, 411-12 (1998) (providing a "gross simplification of a complex history").
[Vol. 49:413
THE NEW-TORT CENTRIFUGE
much criminal law as well as tort law, concerned itself with actions
taken vi et armis and contra pacem domini regis-breaches of the peace
or direct and immediate action that caused injury without excuse.
With the help of a fiction, persons injured by indirect means reached
the king's courts on the same writ. "Trespass in a similar case," it was
said.41
If that artifice of pleading does not sound silly enough-we Torts
people may be too used to this fiction by now-consider ejectment,
somewhat less familiar within the speciality. Two men dispute title to
a parcel of land. Each claims he owns it. Shall one or both of them
take the question to court and seek a declaratory judgment? Not so
fast. For centuries the king's courts allowed no such remedy. 42 In-
stead the plaintiff was compelled to invent a fictitious lease, held by a
fictitious lessee, the ever-quarrelsome John Doe. According to the
plaintiff's complaint, the tenant John Doe was wrongfully ejected from
the parcel of land by another figment of the lawyer's imagination,
Richard Roe. Now the court may proceed with the question of title.43
What could have been the point of such fictions?44 Why make
plaintiffs' counsel speak falsely in Latin and law French-vi et armis,
references to violence-before a hurt person can gain recompense for
accidental injury?45 The metaphor of centrifugal and centripetal
forces in tort development helps to describe the function of legal fic-
tions as they originated in England and moved to the United States.
41. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 71-74 (3d ed. 1990).
42. Jacob Corr6, a legal historian, reminds me that the writ of right provided a medieval ana-
logue to modem declaratory judgment. The writ had many applications, including the resolution
of land-title disputes. See STROUD FRANCIS CHARLES MILsoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE COMMON LAW 128-29 (2d ed. 1981) (noting that the writ of right was used to restore prop-
erty to the heirs of those dispossessed in war). The writ of right, however, in function did not
obviate the need to resort to ejectment. See infra note 44.
43. For a discussion of ejectment fictions, see DEREK ROEBUCK, THE BACKGROUND OF THE
COMMON LAW 55 (2d ed. 1990).
44. See MILSOM, supra note 42, at 162 (noting that "an element of pantomime" was involved
in the use of the ejectment writ; there must have been considerable advantages to using the writ,
"[blut we do not know what they were").
45. Cf. I. de S. et ux. v. W. de S. (Y.B. Lib. Ass'm, folio 99, placitum 60 (1348)) (reporting
plaintiff's contention that the defendant "beat" the plaintiff's wife "with force and arms" even
though, according to the plaintiff's own account, the defendant had only flung a hatchet at the
door of his tavern without touching the wife). Milsom notes a 1317 case involving a claim that
the defendant had diluted the plaintiff's wine with salt water after the plaintiff had left the wine
in the defendant's custody. MILSOM, supra note 42, at 289. This act was alleged to have been
done "with force and arms to wit with swords and bows and arrows ... against the king's peace."
Id. Milsom adds that "[b]latant" distortions of vi et armis and contra pacem regis became rarer
in the late fourteenth century, mainly because "lawyers were being discreet." Id.
1999]
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Embedded in the concept of a legal fiction are two temporal constitu-
ents: the solid rock-ribbed past and shaky present exigency. 46
"Trespass," as a wrong, tells subjects and citizens that the sovereign
will not tolerate disruption and provocation without cause. The prin-
ciple unites and reassures. Meanwhile, or soon afterwards, variations
and new circumstances challenge the core of the principle. Lawyers
can argue for a "case" writ by showing that mediated carelessness
causes injuries similar to those caused by trespass, implicates the same
social welfare concerns, and is equally receptive to judicial control.
By maintaining connection to trespass, the action for "case" expresses
respect for the past and insists on continuity in tort law-a centripetal
force. By repudiating the requirement of immediacy, the "case" writ
provides redress for a variety of accidents unrelated to the direct ap-
plication of force. Case law becomes more varied, eclectic, scat-
tered-the centrifuge.
Similar forces operate in contemporary tort development. Judges
and commentators sometimes say that we have outgrown legal fic-
tions47 in the way that modernists occasionally claim that they are no
longer shackled to circumlocution and social convention. As a result,
the writs have been abandoned, though more slowly and tentatively
than one might suppose. 48 Meanwhile, a tug to the center continues.
In the formation process described in How to Make a New Tort, we
46. In his ingenious commentary on the three languages of the common law-English, Latin
and French (now called Anglo-French or law French)-J.H. Baker builds an argument that I
have found useful in pressing the metaphor of centrifugal and centripetal energy. After describ-
ing the functions of these three languages in the formation of the common law, Baker relates
them to substantive effects. See J.H. Baker, The Three Languages of the Common Law, 43 Mc-
GILL L.J. 5, 7-8 (1998). For example, lawyers used English in speech and French in papers,
maintaining two sets of words for many common concepts-buy/purchase, give/donate, be-
queath/devise, steal/[commit] larceny-and this partial redundancy put law in a formal sphere,
intelligible yet also outside of daily life. Id. at 8. Mummified and precise, Latin helped establish
the common-law fixation on precedent and technicality, a stabilizing fulcrum between the other
two languages. Id. at 15. Like me, Baker is struck by paradox within legal change: how peculiar
of the common law, he comments, to embrace Latinate vocabulary while rejecting Latinate law.
Id. A mix of accessibility and obscurity, precision and disorder, and stability and change at least
accompanied the development of a unique legal system and may have been a cause of that
uniqueness.
47. See Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REv. 363, 519-29 (1930) (describing fictions as
transitional devices); see also In re Clarke's Will, 284 N.W. 876, 878, 878 n.1 (Minn. 1939) (quot-
ing anthropologist Sir Henry Maine, who praised legal fictions as "the agencies by which law is
brought into harmony with society ... but fictions have had their day").
48. Cf. MAITLAND, supra note 33, at 1 (1909) ("The forms of action we have buried, but they
still rule us from their graves."). Maitland's aphorism retains power. See Harold J. Berman &
Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45
EMORY L.J. 437, 520 n.171 (1996) (noting that the forms of action were not yet "buried" in
American federal courts when Maitland wrote, and that in contemporary pleading, lawyers still
must categorize their claims).
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observe an emphasis on unity rather than dispersal. Prosser was bet-
ter than anyone at the job of making a new tort look conservative,
related to origins more respectable than tort (i.e. contract and prop-
erty), not really new at all, and scarcely the product of human agency.
The current new-torts scene shows an inclination toward decentraliza-
tion as well as centralization.
"Are new torts being developed?" is the Clifford Symposium query,
our panel's raison d'assemblage. The passive voice is revealing. Who
or what is the agent of development? Where is the locus of these new
formations? Writers have referred interchangeably to "courts" and
"judges" when discussing common-law formation and legal interpreta-
tion.49 Readers have understood that the question adverts to rivalry
between the judiciary and another institution, usually the legislature,
about the power to make law.50
But courts contain more than judges. For openers, one sector
within "courts" that does not include judges is the civil jury, an entity
of interest to Clifford conveners in the past.51 Torts scholarship identi-
fies the jury as an institution in its own right, controlled only in part by
judges and rules. Like a Heraclitean river the jury remains the same
yet not the same over time. Researchers and consultants study "ju-
ries" to generalize about them, even though they know that the same
group of people will never assemble again to make or influence "judi-
cial" decisions.5 2
Also found under the judicial umbrella, shoving each other now and
then, are sectors in the bar that identify professionally with either
plaintiffs or defendants. The respective histories of the Second and
Third Restatements of Torts, both of which are especially noted for
49. Michael D. Green, The Road Less Well Traveled (And Seen): Contemporary Lawmaking
in Products Liability, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 377 (1999); Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law
Un-Makers: Recent California Experience With "New" Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 455 (1999).
50. Chief Justice Marshall said something famous in Marbury v. Madison about judicial power
vis-a-vis the executive branch, but-quick-did he arrogate it to the courts or to judges? It
hardly matters. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165 (1803). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23-26 (2d ed. 1988) (referring interchangeably to "the
courts," "judicial review," and "judges").
51. See generally Symposium, The American Civil Jury: Illusion and Reality, 48 DEPAUL L.
REv. 197 (1998) (discussing the civil jury).
52. For surveys of research on the function of juries in civil cases, see generally STEPHEN
DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995) (presenting
numerous surveys). See Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empiri-
cal Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 853-61 (1998). Professor Vidmar notes that, curiously, the
researchers have not often studied judges' perceptions of juries, id. at 854, thereby forfeiting
attention to continuity and institutional coherence within the political system.
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their treatment of products liability,53 offer an illustration of this
change away from unity and toward dispersal. Section 402A pro-
voked a hostile response from the defense bar: shortly after its publi-
cation, the Defense Research Institute contended that its
proclamation of strict products liability departed from existing law
and was not a true restatement. 54 But this protest, little known and
seldom recalled, is a droplet when compared to the rivers of partisan
outcry that accompanied the revision of 402A in the 1990s. Today,
lawyers identified with plaintiffs routinely group themselves together
to support or, more often, oppose a proposal that would affect torts
practice in the courts. We see them in Congress, at the state legisla-
tures, in the American Law Institute, around think tanks and working
groups. Meanwhile, the defense sector, though sometimes riven by
divided interests (sellers of goods versus insurers, manufacturers ver-
sus retailers), has even more potent influence on judicial outcomes.55
Dispersal spreads beyond the divisions and subcamps previously
called "the courts" and "the judiciary," as legislation continues to alter
the content of tort law. Statutes are often thought of as tending to
unify rather than to disperse; in Torts, however, they operate against a
stubborn common-law background that does not always yield with
grace to their official supremacy. 56 Neither the judiciary nor the legis-
lature has the last word on what constitutes new tort law,57 and this
53. The first segment of the Restatement (Third) of Torts to be adopted by the American Law
Institute concerned products liability. The Second Restatement, a comprehensive encyclopedia
of tort law, has been cited more often on products liability than on any other subdoctrine in
Torts. See James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Will a New Restatement Help Settle Trou-
bled Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1257, 1260 n.17 (1993) (noting that section 402A is
"the most frequently cited section of any Restatement").
54. See Herbert Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy in the Restate-
ment Work of the American Law Institute, 13 ST. Louis U. L.J. 185, 190 (1968).
55. See generally Ralph Nader, Lawyers and Law Students as Tools of Democracy, 17 WHIT-
TIER L. REV. 3, 5 (1995) (ascribing great power to "the tortfeasors' lobby"); Peter H. Schuck,
Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 952, 952 n.48
(1995) (differing with a suggestion by Professor John Coffee that the defense bar, as a commu-
nity, spreads and receives strategic knowledge about torts practice faster than the plaintiffs' bar).
56. In Bird v. Holbrook, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (1828), the court struggled to construe a statute
that prohibited the use of spring guns under most circumstances. The statute took effect after
the plaintiff's injury but before the court's decision. The judges apparently resented the domin-
ion of Parliament, if their reading of some portions of the Act as "declaratory" (that is, not
constraining their decision making) and others "prohibitive" (that is, an unfortunate obstacle to
judicial power) is any guide. The judicial attitude in Bird has a modem flavor and enjoys mod-
ern support. See Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of
Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV 533 (1999) (recommending that judges regard some statutes less rever-
ently than the principle of legislative supremacy would dictate).
57. One might think of this division in terms of "checks and balances," but that phrase implies
stasis and certainty, traits less in evidence today than in the old Prosser era, the new-tort time,
when sectors did not compete openly and self-consciously to affect the formation of tort rules.
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fact is acknowledged more openly now than before. Again, products
liability provides an example of dispersal and new assertions of power
within the common law of torts. For several decades, some lawyers
and scholars denounced the rise of strict liability in tort for product-
caused injury at the expense of the Uniform Commercial Code's over-
lapping scheme codifying (through the legislature, whose lawmaking is
supposed to outrank that of judges) the law of warranties, disclaimers,
and third-party beneficiaries. 5 8 Courts won that battle, perhaps, but
the war continues, especially in the familiar theater of judicial re-
view.59 Judges have struck down several tort reform statutes in the
last decade, using their powers under state and federal constitutions.60
The picture is almost unique to Torts. Although judicial experience
with sentencing guidelines, for instance, suggests that the conflict be-
tween legislatures and courts continues in other areas of the law, stat-
utes occupy an especially uncertain place in tort doctrine. As Mark
Rosen has pointed out, when Oliver Wendell Holmes prepared his
exegesis on the common law, he chose to write about six doctrines:
criminal law, torts, contract, bailments, wills, and succession. 61 Today,
a century later, five of the six subjects have been'reduced to codes.62
Torts continues to resist codification in general, while absorbing new
statutes as sources of doctrine. The uneven reception contributes to
dispersal.
58. Compare Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976) (rejecting GM con-
tention that the UCC blocked adoption of strict liability in tort), with Cline v. Prowler Indus. of
Maryland, 418 A.2d 968, 980 (Del. 1980) (holding that the UCC preempted strict tort liability).
See also Reed Dickerson, The ABC'S of Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section 402A
and the Code, 36 TErN. L. REv. 439, 452 (1969) (attacking strict liability in tort as contrary to
legislative supremacy); Richard E. Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products
Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, .51 VA. L. REV. 804, 851 (1965) (expressing pref-
erence for "an ultimate legislative solution" to problems of products liability).
59. See supra note 29.
60. See Wells v. Thomson Newspaper Holdings, 183 F.R.D. 225 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (invalidating
Ohio statute of repose); see also Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) (invali-
dating state tort reform statute in its entirety); Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1998)
(striking down punitive damages statute as violative of Kentucky constitution); Morris v. Savoy,
576 N.E.2d 765, 769 (Ohio 1991) (striking down caps on damages). See generally Victor E.
Schwartz, What You Can Do to Save Tort Reform from Judicial Nullification, METROPOLITAN
CORP. CouNs., Nov. 1998, at 1 (noting that dozens of judicial decisions in the last decade have
held state tort reform unconstitutional).
61. See Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law? Recent American Codifi-
cations, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law's Subsequent Development, 1994 Wis.
L. REv. 1119, 1123.
62. Id.
1999)
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Compendia such as the torts Restatements help to blur the line be-
tween statutes and case law.63 The traditional Restatement mission
was to extract a code in blackletter out of case law, relying mostly on
judges' ratios decidendi but adding a dose of improvement. 64 The ap-
paratus first makes codification out of case holdings and then cycles
back to influence the outcome of case holdings with codification. As
if this mechanism were not a sufficient muddying of the distinction
between statutes and case law, the Third Restatement chose, for the
first time, to "restate" statutes as well as case holdings; in Comments
to the products liability blackletter, the Third Restatement relies in
part on tort reform statutes to support its claim of a trend or direction
in the courts.65 Thus doctrine has dispersed among three separate sec-
tors: statutes, case law, and nonstatutory codification.
These centrifugal forces are countered by other forces that unify.
Statutes and the Restatement bring outcomes and rationales together.
Sectors of the bar that advocate either for plaintiffs or defendants
have contributed procedural unity (modern class actions, consolida-
tion, multidistrict practice), stable political alliances (against or in
favor of tort reform, for instance), and an element of predictability in
litigation. Even the civil jury, so often blamed for its hard-to-predict
responses, traces its origins well past the United States Constitution
and provides a source of continuity over time.
A more fundamental centripetal effect operates as well in Torts.
Unity around principles, or at least themes, characterizes doctrinal de-
velopment. The content of these principles can certainly be disputed,
and so rather than try to come up with a canon-or land again in my
old pitfall of thinking that parsimonious criteria can avert diffi-
culty66 -I would just name a couple. Breach of the peace perseveres
in various newer doctrines. When we get past the image of "swords
and bows and arrows," 67 we see breach of the peace in modern nui-
sance, for instance, in addition to most of the intentional torts that
allege personal injury. Constitutional torts stipulate that the king can
do wrong indeed, or at least his minions can, and so disruption of the
peace in the form of official brutishness is actionable. One might even
think of strict liability in terms of breach of the peace: liability without
63. Influential model legislation such as the Uniform Products Liability Act of the late 1970s,
which was not adopted in its entirety by any state legislature, is of similar effect.
64. t elaborate in Anita Bernstein, Restatement Redux, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1663 (1995).
65. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucTs LIABILITY § 1 cmt. e (1997) (im-
munizing non-manufacturer sellers from strict liability); id. § 2 cmt. d (requiring plaintiffs to
prove a reasonable alternative design).
66. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 45.
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fault usually bespeaks a jarring departure from a more orderly set of
routine actions.68 The academic literature that endeavors to explain
restrictive recovery for economic loss, in which some participants
from this Symposium have joined,69 has not said as much in so many
words, but one might venture to argue that economic loss is less com-
pensable because it is less of a visual disruption, a violent jarring, than
personal injury or damage to tangible property.70
In Torts the concept of trespass/breach is our most venerable ances-
tor, but Torts has other centripetal themes too. Off the top of my
head I would mention autonomy and human dignity (even when utili-
tarianism would dictate a contrary conclusion); 71 an abiding commit-
ment to the money-matrix (in Torts we eschew equitable remedies and
seldom think seriously about nonpecuniary recompense for injury);72
a belief (which is expressly contrary to the principles of criminal law)
that maiming a person can be worse, in the sense of cost to the de-
fendant, than extinguishing her life;73 a tendency to encourage injured
people to come forward with their plaints and then to find these ac-
68. See generally George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV.
537 (1972) (contrasting reciprocal and non-reciprocal risks).
69. See Richard L. Abel, Should Tort Law Protect Property Against Accidental Loss?, 23 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 79, 80 (1986); Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic
Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1513 (1985); Gary T. Schwartz, Economic Loss In
American Tort Law: The Examples of J'Aire and of Products Liability, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
37, 37-38 (1986).
70. "One" took this plunge in Anita Bernstein, The Representational Dialectic (With Illustra-
tions from Obscenity, Forfeiture, and Accident Law), 87 CAL. L. REV. 305, 344-45 (1999).
71. See Richard W. Wright, Principled Adjudication, 7 CANTERBURY L. REV. 265 (1999) (not-
ing that consent doctrine defies utilitarian prescriptions).
72. On the status of equitable relief in tort actions, see Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257
N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (expressing judicial reluctance to issue an injunction). On non-monetary
paths not taken in American tort law, see, for example, Leslie Bender, Changing the Values in
Tort Law, 25 TULSA L.J. 759, 772 (1990) (proposing that corporate tortfeasors be compelled to
provide caregiving as well as money damages to injured plaintiffs); Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur
Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 L. &
Soc'Y REV. 461, 481-83 (1986) (considering apology as a remedy for crimes and torts).
73. Although the common law maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona ("a personal right
of action dies with a person") has been superseded by wrongful-death and survival statutes, tort
law continues to reward the maimed-yet-alive plaintiff more generously than one killed by tor-
tious conduct. See Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards
in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883,
887 (1993) (noting that damages for death are lower than damages for severe trauma resulting in
such effects as "quadriplegia, blindness, and brain damage"). By contrast, it is a truism of crimi-
nal law that murder is the worst crime a person can commit (putting aside those exceptionally
situated persons capable of such exotica as significant treason). See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S
DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 81-82
(1993); Don E. Scheid, Constructing a Theory of Punishment, Desert, and the Distribution of
Punishments, 10 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 441, 494 (1997).
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counts wanting, to dismiss them;74 and a centrist view of victims' con-
tribution to their own injuries that, regardless of the official doctrinal
or statutory flag flying at any time, tends to reject the harshness of
contributory negligence but while making plaintiffs pay for their folly
or venturesomeness. 75 The ALI statement provides another recitation
of unifying principles in tort law.76 Another writer might draft yet
another list. The included items vary slightly, but few would deny the
continuity of some tort principles.
III. THE WIDER CENTRIFUGE
The centrifugal forces that make new-tort formation more varied
and disunited operate elsewhere in the common law. Think again of
Prosser. His kind cannot return because scholars can no longer obtain
from doctrinal writing the prestige on which Prosser drew to get his
new torts formed. (Senior scholars would worry, I think, about a jun-
ior colleague who proposed to write articles titled "Proximate Cause
in California" or "Transferred Intent. '77) If there has indeed been a
"decline of law as an autonomous discipline," as Judge Posner sug-
gests,78 then law-especially the common law, but also statutes and
regulations-will continue to receive influence from more sources and
become more varied in its reaches.
A. The Rise of Consequentialism
Consider the leading extradisciplinary influence. Efficiency often
militates in favor of fundamental doctrinal change. It challenges even
the most famous Cardozo opinion: correlativity between the plaintiff's
injury and the defendant's wrong, so beloved to traditionalists like Er-
nest Weinrib and other readers of Palsgraf,79 has nothing to do with
social welfare and could profitably be abandoned, if profitability can
be expressed in terms of better incentives. Cost internalization and
risk reallocation need not depend on the cooperation of injured, liti-
74. In pursuing this line of thought I have benefited from correspondence with Alan Calnan
and reading his unpublished writings.
75. See Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Rein-
terpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1773 (1981).
76. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 2 (Discussion Draft 1999)
(identifying broad common concepts in negligence liability.)
77. See William L. Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEX. L. REV. 650, 650 (1967); William L.
Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L. REV. 369, 369 (1950).
78. See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100
HARV. L. REV. 761, 761 (1987).
79. See Ernest L. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 512-13 (1989);
see also Heidi M. Hurd, Correcting Injustice to Corrective Justice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51,
94-95 (1991) (elaborating on this view).
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gating plaintiffs. Even stalwarts of tort like "injury," "compensation,"
and "actual cause" become dispensable. 80 Tort law has not yet gone
so far, but then the influence of allocative efficiency has not yet
peaked.
A more diffuse consequentialism attracts more support among Torts
constituencies and adds to the centrifugal forces spinning tort law
away from a center. Take invasion of privacy, another twentieth-cen-
tury new tort, for example. To Prosser, invasion of privacy amounted
to four variations, each duly numbered in Restatement blackletter. 81
Contemporary scholars are more inclined to think of other things,
usually costs. What motivates a blackmailer, and how can we stop him
from causing social loss?82 How can doctrine help to extract the best
use out of the value in a person's image or likeness? 83 Feminist schol-
ars explore privacy in terms of its consequences for women.84 Other
writers analyze the privacy tort in relation to unwanted revelations
about another person's homosexuality or HIV/AIDS status.85 Even
Susan Gilles's article about recharacterizing part of privacy law as
"breach of confidence"-a work replete with doctrine about contracts,
torts, fiduciaries, and the First Amendment-considers the effects of
privacy law on women, gay persons, and rape victims. 86 Presumably
Prosser also cared about what would happen if his proposals suc-
ceeded and whose ox would be gored, but his expositions seldom ad-
80. I believe Richard Wright was the first Torts scholar to make this point. See Richard W.
Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 435, 439 (1985).
81. See Prosser, Privacy, supra note 13, at 389. The Second Restatement sections are § 652B,
§ 652C, § 652D, and § 652E.
82. See Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Leture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 675
(1988) (noting similarities between blackmail and ordinary trade); Sidney W. DeLong, Black-
mailers, Bribe Takers, and the Second Paradox, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1663, 1674 (1993) (studying
blackmail with reference to the Coase theorem); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman,
Blackmail: An Economic Analysis of the Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1859-65 (1993) (contend-
ing that blackmail is wrong because it is wasteful).
83. Compare Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1 (1997) (defending the right of
publicity, which includes the right to retain financial gains associated with one's fame), with
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81
CAL. L. REV. 125, 205-28 (1993) (decrying right of publicity as unsound).
84. The works of Anita Allen-Castellitto, published under an earlier surname, are preemi-
nent. See generally ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY AccEss: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCI-
ETY (1988); Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723 (1999).
85. For analyses of the privacy tort with respect to AIDS-related and HIV-related disclosures,
see Jeff Glenney, Note, AIDS: A Crisis in Confidentiality, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1701, 1727 (1989);
Grace-Marie Mowery, Comment, A Patient's Right of Privacy in Computerized Pharmacy
Records, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 697, 714 (1998).
86. See Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions
of Privacy, 43 BuFF. L. REV. 1, 13 (1995).
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verted to consequences and therefore could stay close to a formalist
center.
B. Technology
The growth of electronic legal texts sends the common law swirling
in the same centrifugal eddy. Cases now divide into new fragments
that unite with other fragments, away from the body of the opinion.
Words migrate into different contexts, allowing influences to spread
across doctrines and sources of law (it's easy enough to open two win-
dows at once, say a law review article and a statute). Electronic data
storage has given contemporary case law an unprecedented accuracy
in the filing and retrieval of judicial opinions-few scrivener's errors,
no temporal delays to speak of 87-but also an unequally unprece-
dented power to mislead by misplacement and to cut off judicial sub-
tlety before it even reaches a reader.
Powerful search engines drive this force: whereas his predecessors
read, or tell younger people they used to read, encyclopedias and trea-
tises and digests, a contemporary law student in need of information
about the law knows some of the awesome power of the password and
turns first (maybe "only" is the adverb, rather than "first") to a com-
puter. The most effective searches look for one unusual word, or two
in a close sequence, and so context and nuance that situate discussions
in their original place are clipped away.88 I'm not shaking my fist at
today's wayward youth: I conduct my research myself at an office
computer, and it's great for what it can do.8 9 The point is rather that
part of the power of electronic searching consists of centrifugal en-
ergy; whether anyone likes it or not, a generation of lawyers now cuts
judicial opinions into new pieces. New units drive out the old. The
page break is dead: long live "/s" and "/p"! 90 When perceptions and
87. See Bernstein, supra note 64, at 1672.
88. See William T. Braithwaite, How is Technology Affecting the Practice and Profession of
Law?, 22 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1113, 1122 (1991) (expressing worry about future trends); Stephen
L. Haynes, Modern Technology and Its Effect on Research and Communication, 86 AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. & PROC. 604, 610 (1992) (arguing that information technology has deleterious effects on
legal expression); Molly Warner Lien, Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer,
48 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 101 (1998) (lamenting "the absence of an enlightened, broad perspective"
in online searches).
89. For example, when I wanted to find a few law review articles hostile to Ronald Dworkin's
posture that judicial integrity can be understood in terms of a personified heroic judge, I found it
expedient to type "Hercules," a name I knew is often invoked with scorn, into Lexis.
90. See generally Anthony Aarons, Cite-Fight: The War on West, L. OFFICE COMPUTING,
April/May 1995, at 47 (noting shifts in perception, originating in technological change, that now
interpret judicial opinions as broken at the sentence or paragraph level rather than at the page
level).
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usages make new fragments out of the published judicial opinion,
changes in common law development must follow.
IV. CONCLUSION
"Sounds kind of postmodern," said a friend to me. I blanched,91 but
had to admit that the new-tort centrifuge does bear a certain resem-
blance to the old pomo shuffle. In contrast to new-tort formation in a
more formalist era, I have contended, new torts form today, if they
form at all,92 in a much more contigent and local fashion. Annual
surveys in the National Law Journal9 3 do foster the conclusion that
new torts look like a postmodern exegesis on knowledge: "dispersed,
multiple, fragmented, and theoretically varied," in contrast to the
"continuity, unity, totality, comprehensiveness and consistency" that
marked the Prosser era.94 If postmodernism is a word susceptible to
definition, then some of its content fits.
I would agree that a move resembling the transition from modern-
ism to postmodernism has occurred in new-tort formation. Prosser
always spoke ex cathedra, even when he wrote only as a scholar and
not an ALI lawmaker. By contrast most contemporary Torts scholar-
ship concedes that it is telling only part of a story and does not have a
universal claim to authority. In the heyday of the Restatements, Torts
readers could tell the most certain truths by their blackletter type font
and find the next level of certainty in the Comments, down through
Illustrations and Reporter's Notes. (I exaggerate, but not that much.)
Contemporary readers and writers, by contrast, see the inverted com-
mas around the "objective" standard for negligence, find gendered ex-
clusion (plus other meanings) in "the reasonable man," disagree about
basic questions of legal history (did tort doctrine subsidize industry in
the nineteenth century? was early liability for accidents strict or based
on fault?), and question whether first-year vocabulary about acci-
dents, like "fault," "proximate cause," or "defect," means anything
constant from one setting to another.95
91. The word can be an epithet. See Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Are You Now or Have You Ever
Been... Postmodern?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 11, 1998, at B4.
92. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
94. See Hugh J. Silverman, Modernism and Postmodernism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY SUPPLEMENT 353, 354 (Donald M. Borchert ed., 1996).
95. For an all-under-one-roof compendium of arguments on some of these questions, see
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 70-75 (1999) (discussing controversies over the history of tort lia-
bility); 89-91 (discussing subsidy theory); 110-13 (contrasting objective and subjective ap-
proaches to reasonableness); 395-433 (summarizing points of contention in products liability
law). The debate over the gendered status of the reasonable man emerges nicely from two
sources: Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law Courts, 1890-1930, 21 HARV.
1999]
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Important distinctions remain, however, between postmodernism
and the understanding of current new-tort formation proposed here. I
have offered the centrifuge as a metaphor for part of new-tort devel-
opment today. The centripetal counterforce, which received more
than its share of attention in How to Make a New Tort, continues to
maintain unity in torts. The centrifuge makes fragments fly, but tort
law keeps hold of its broad principles. I see integrity in its refusal to
accept codification, its insistence on a last word beyond statutes, the
Restatement, academic fashions, and "policy" generally. Legal schol-
ars and students who dislike Torts disagree, finding the subject vacu-
ous and impossible to control. We at the Clifford Symposium have
found something affirmative in these fissures.
Whether or not "the new-tort centrifuge" is a postmodernist con-
struct, however, I appreciate the epithet for at least two reasons,
neither of them particularly kind to postmodernism. First, we may
worry, along with philosopher Simon Blackburn, about encouraging
the centrifuge to operate at too high a speed. Blackburn reproaches
postmodernist thought for
a cavalier dismissal of the success of science in generating human
improvement, an exaggeration of the admitted fallibility of any at-
tempt to gain knowledge in the humane disciplines, and an ignoring
of the quite ordinary truth, that while human history and law admit
of no one final description, they certainly admit of more or less ac-
curate ones, just as a landscape permits of no one unique map; yet,
there can be more or less accurate maps. 96
The earnest task of righting wrongs, described in How to Make a New
Tort, is an endeavor that we in Torts ought to admire and preserve. 97
The alternative may be in the end even more hidebound than resist-
ance to new tort proposals.98
The other reason to be grateful for the wake-up call inherent in
using "postmodern" as an epithet is that it reminds those of us con-
WOMEN'S L.J. 79 (1998); Barbara Y. Welke, Unreasonable Women: Gender and the Law of Acci-
dental Injury, 1870-1920, 19 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 369 (1994). For general summaries of aca-
demic contention around Torts questions, see Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L.
REv. 785 (1990); David M. Becker, My Two Cents on Changing Times, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 45, 54
n.33 (1998); Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the
Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49 (1991).
96. SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 294-95 (1994).
97. Cf. Jurgen Habermas, Modernity-An Incomplete Project, 22 NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 3
(1981) (arguing that postmodernism is premature because modernity needs to conclude its
work).
98. See generally RICHARD RORTY, CONTIGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989) (advocat-
ing a reconciliation of postmodernism and social activism); MADAN SARUP, AN INTRODUCTORY
GUIDE TO POST-STRUCrURALISM AND POSTMODERNISM (1989) (arguing that postmodernism has
conservative tendencies).
[Vol. 49:413
THE NEW-TORT CENTRIFUGE
cerned with law reform to remember the ends of new-tort formation
as well as the means. Again, I take here a slightly contrary posture to
the one of How to Make a New Tort. There I laid down the choice for
activists-if they are successful they can form a new tort, or they can
allow a progressive social movement to develop around their overt
leadership; but any gain in one realm will cause a loss in the
other-and concluded that I preferred new torts. I still do, but let us
now praise expanded health insurance, meaningful safety regulation,
and funding for legislative mandates-all tasks that are still uncom-
pleted. Taken to excess, new-tort preoccupation can distract reform-
ers and policymakers from pursuing some of what these new torts
would hope to achieve.
As tort development continues to spin outward and inward, the
existence of new-tort formation will continue to be debated. Causes
of action will look like new torts on centripetal days, but like "new
wrinkles on old ones" 99 when we are in a centrifugal mood. Observers
of Torts might have hoped for better calibration of our instruments of
change; 1°° but then if you like certainty, you'll have been drawn to
almost any other area of American legal doctrine.
99. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
100. Justice Michel Bastarache of the Canadian Supreme Court, for instance, criticizes the
Canadian legal system-his point applies with equal force to the law of the United States, which
develops from a similar variety of inputs and institutions-for its inability to perceive whether it
is responding effectively to ambient change. He queries whether the Canadian legal system is
mired in the equivalent of old, unresponsive writs, and therefore unable to cope with society at
"the new millennium." Bastarache, supra note 40, at 412. He foresees dangerous new sources of
dispersal, mentioning in particular the challenges of minority-group identity and a menacing
version of twenty-first-century technological change. Id. In this Article, by contrast, I have spo-
ken affectionately of the writ system, praising its combination of stability and innovation, and
also insisted that dispersal in tort law responds to a counterforce. Perhaps dispersal in the future
will grow less benign in its aims and means. For whatever comfort it can give Justice Bastarache,
I commend Professor Baker's sanguine history of language-conflict and invasion at the dawn of
the common law. See Baker, supra note 46, at 15.
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